Dutch Second Aggression, a Desperate War

At the daybreak, Sunday, December 19, 1948, Jogjakarta residents were startled by series of bomb explosions heard from the direction of Maguwo Airfield. Not less than 17 warplanes consisting of B-25 Mitchells, F-51 Mustangs, and P-40L Kittyhawks, under what so-called Operatie Kraai,  launched bombs and rockets wiping out any important targets seen in the airfield.

Having received clearance from Maguwo, 18 DC-3 Dakotas, which were swirling over the corvette Hr. Ms. Torenvalk anchoring in the Indian Ocean, south of Jogjakarta, flew straight to the north. Two red berets Korps Special Troepen (KST) companies parachuted on the runway attacking 150 Republican troops who defended the airfield assisted by some 30 Air Academy cadets.

TNI had made a big blunder when they decided, a couple of days before the air raid,  to move all heavy anti-air-raid guns from Maguwo out the city for military exercises. The airfield became defenseless as, for security reasons, some Good Office Committee (KTN) members holding a meeting in Kaliurang, north of Jogjakarta, requested the airfield defense troops to dismantle mine traps they had implanted there.

Within half an hour, the Dutch red beret troops took over the airfield without even having a casualty. The Republican lost 33 lives, mostly academy cadets, four warplanes under repaired, and Avro Anson small passenger plane ready to take off. They soon established n airlift Semarang-Maguwo transporting around 2,600 troops of Regiment Stoot-troepen, 80 battle jeeps, a significant amount of ammunition, and logistics enough for three days battle.

The Dutch troops’ movement to the capital city faced almost no resistance. Most of the Republican forces had been going outside the city for military exercises. The TNI intelligence wrongly anticipated the Dutch attack, which they believed would come crossing through the west demarcation line in Gombong, the nearest Federal area to Jogjakarta.

Nobody anticipated that the Dutch would have the courage to launch such military aggression. They attacked the Republic just right in the middle of the KTN meeting intended to mediate the peace settlement between the two conflicting countries. The Dutch did such desperate action as their lost on East Indie would be catastrophic. Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren.

The man behind Operatie Kraai was Lieutenant General Simon Spoor,  an ambitious KNIL high Commander. The night before the raid, in Andir airbase, Bandung, where the operation took place, he encouraged his troops: “You are chosen for de laatste action to capture Magoewo Airfield tomorrow morning. God bless you.” Spoor was confident that being weakened by the Madiun affair, they would easily crush the Republic within one month.

At midnight, the Dutch troops tightly surrounded the Presidential Palace and gave severe warnings by shooting the front of the Palace with machine guns. Colonel Van Langen, the troops’ commander, radioed his superiors that he was about to arrest President Soekarno. Meeting face to face with Soekarno, Van Beek gave his salute and said: “You are now a house prisoner.”

The morning before, General Soedirman instructed TNI troops to fight back and never surrender to the enemy. He hastily met Soekarno reporting his departure to launch jungle warfare. “Your place is right on the battlefield. I would stay here to settle down the Dutch aggression in a diplomatic way,” said Soekarno.

A total of 150 persons became Dutch house prisoners included Soekarno and Hatta, together with their families, Soetan Sjahrir, Agoes Salim, Assat, and Leimena. Soekarno and Agoes Salim were then transferred to Brastagi, Medan, while Hatta and others went to Bangka Island.

The international reactions towards unexpected aggression were prompt. The Americans accused the Dutch of using the Marshall Plan to finance the attack. The most vigorous blow came from UN Security Council as they decided to hold an extraordinary meeting postponing their recess, which began on December 18, the day Spoor launched  Operatie Kraai.

On December 25, when everybody was on holiday, the Council was working hard, issuing a resolution for the Dutch to stop the aggression. The Dutch had no choice but to stop the operation by the end of the year. Early January 1949, the Security Council passed a resolution for the restoration of the Republican government.

Muso, Brutus from the East

Soemadi saw far in the sky horizon an amphibious Catalina plane approaching the swampy area just near Tulungagung, East Java. He got an order to pick up some VIPs coming from a faraway land with his brand new tires sedan. It was on the morning of August 10, 1948, when the plane landed and he saw at last two passengers got off the plane. He recognized the first, slim, and tall passenger as Soeripno, the Indonesian representative in Praha, but not the second one who just introduced himself as Soeparto, the Soeripno’s secretary.

The long journey to Solo didn’t make him close to this rather obscure secretary as though he just fell from somewhere in the sky after disappearing from his homeland for so many years. On their arrival in Solo, his curiosity arose when Wikana, the dismissed Military Governor, then one of the leaders of People’s Democratic Front (FDR), warmly welcomed them.

Soeparto alias Muso didn’t want to waste time. He started to campaign introducing his brand new concept, “the New Way.” He criticized PKI leaders for having no influential grassroots in laborers, farmers, youths, and soldiers. PKI cadres should act openly, he urged, not hiding behind People’s Democratic Front (FDR) as an underground party. Muso’s idea to establish a National Front was supported by Amir Sjarifuddin, saying that the “Oude Heer” would undoubtedly accelerate the program they had set up.

On August 13, Muso met Soekarno at the national palace, Jogjakarta, where the two old friends were warmly embracing each other. They had lived and spent their youth time together in Tjokroaminoto’s boarding house when they were in high school. At the end of the meeting, Soekarno called for Muso to appease the clash between political factions for which Muso answered pretentiously: “I do come here to establish order.”  His words sounded somewhat puzzling, but nobody suspected that he would dare to stab Soekarno from behind.

On that very same day, within PKI’s political bureau, Muso just forgot his warm meeting with Soekarno a couple of hours before and criticizing the latter the way he led the Indonesian revolution. For him, Soekarno was a mere nationalist bourgeois who failed to revolutionize his government’s course of action.

Muso called for PKI to metamorphose into a radical party that should aggressively promote its ideology and launched armed struggles whenever necessary. On August 21, he took over the leadership of FDR and merged [illegal] PKI, Labor Party, Socialist Party, and Pesindo into a single party, the legalized and open PKI. He aimed to make the national army to become people’s army established from and for the people.

Some Labor Party leaders such as S.K. Trimurti and Asranudin refused to merge with PKI unless FDR held a plenary meeting to agree upon. Notwithstanding, Muso ordered the leaders to swear against the government policy, criticized Amir Sjarifuddin for having dissolved his cabinet, giving way for the rightists to take over the political power. In auto-criticism, Amir Sjarifuddin admitted for having received 25 thousand guilders from Van der Plas to establish underground movement against the Japanese.

In a show of force the next day, Muso demanded in front of 50,000 people the replacement of the current Soekarno-Hatta cabinet with that of the national front. On September 5, after declaring PKI as an open political party, he stated the importance of ratifying diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union.

To introduce his revolutionary ideas, Muso held a safari tour to Solo, Madiun, Kediri, Jombang, Bojonegoro, Cepu, Purwodadi, and Wonosobo. He felt that the time was ripe for a proletarian revolution he longed for, for a long time. It was a long dream, a dream that he had since, together with Alimin, were imprisoned for having steered the revolt of Islamic Union (Serikat Islam) Afdeling-B in 1919.

In his status as a PKI fugitive, in December 1925, he attended a secret meeting in Prambanan, Central Java, aiming to organize armed revolts against Dutch colonial within six months. However, before they executed the plot, Muso, together with Budisutjitro and Sugono, the head of the Train Labor Organization, had to escape to Singapore as the Dutch would capture them in early January 1926.

In Singapore, they joined with other PKI leaders: Alimin, Subakat, Sanusi, and Winata, continuing their plot against the Dutch administration as they previously planned. Musso sent Alimin to inform Tan Malaka in Manila, who had become the Komintern’s representative for Southeast Asia, about the Prambanan Plan. Upon the request for him to get Moscow’s support, Tan Malaka refused to do so. He considered the timing was too early and the Dutch administration would easily crush such a weak movement into pieces.

Alimin returned to Singapore and, together with Muso, decided to go to Moscow without Tan Malaka acquaintance. Being unaware of their departure, Tan Malaka sent a report to Komintern in Moscow about the Prambanan Plan, which made Stalin very upset and demanded an immediate abortion of such blunder decision.

But it was too late. Muso and Alimin were on the way to Moscow, while Tan Malaka’s effort to convince his colleagues to abort the plot was with no avail. On November 12, supported only by few branches from Batavia, Banten, Priangan, and West Sumatra, revolts broke through. The Dutch government quickly crushed them and hanged three of the revolt leaders. They declared that PKI was illegal, arresting a total of 13,000, around 9,500 were in jail, and 1,300 were in a remote area in Digul, Papua.

Having learned that the Communist revolt in his country failed, Muso decided to stay in Moscow, joining the Soviet Communist party in which he got the position as the Indonesian affairs section. Under the disguised name of Krause, he used the Communist international media to attack Tan Malaka, qualifying him as Trotskyist,  a traitor who deserved to die.

Stalin aggressively attacked Sun Yat-Sen and Mahatma Gandhi as nationalist bourgeois in Komintern Congress, July 1928, but said nothing about the Communist leaders in Indonesia. It was a gesture of Stalin for Muso to continue his revolutionary movement, albeit he was responsible for the blunder. Muso took this blessing to blame the conflicting PKI leaders for their wrong steps in doing the revolts in Java and Sumatra. Soon after the Congress, Muso had been given the honor as Komintern executive committee member.

In April 1935, Siti Larang, the wife of Sosrokardono, the founder of Sarikat Islam (S.I.) Afdeling-B, then a member of the progressive women movement in Surabaya, met an obscure guest in Simpang Hotel as instructed by Pamudji, the chief of Indonesia Berdjoeang newspaper. The guest was nobody but Muso, who just appeared from his long exile abroad asking for a rented house for him to stay. He took advantage of Dimitrov doctrine, a Komintern strategic change, to rebuild PKI. The principle instructed Komintern members elsewhere to cooperate with their colonial governments to hinder the aggressive fascist movement worldwide.

In several cities, Muso established Democratic Front of Antifascist, also called as the young PKI or PKI 1935 led by seven members of Comintern congress. One of them was Pamudji, the chief editor of Indonesia Berdjuang newspaper, later appointed as one of PKI Central Committee leaders. Muso didn’t miss the opportunity to publish Dimitrov doctrine in Pamudji’s journal intensively.

Muso recruited Sudisman and Soemarsono, and many other young PKI cadres in Surabaya and Solo, influenced Amir Sjarifuddin joining PKI through the leftist Perhimpunan Indonesia. However, the Dutch were not impressed with such doctrine, and their intelligence, Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst, arrested and exiled many of them to Digul mixing with the previous 1926 PKI dissenters. Pamudji managed to escape from the detention, and Muso secretly slipped away back to the Soviet Union.

PKI partisans, however, continued their underground activities, and many of them secretly diffused to the colonial government administration as well as political organizations such as Gerindo and Socialist Party. Amir Sjarifuddin was one of the prominent activists who deliberately cooperated with the Dutch. Later he acknowledged that he received money from Van der Plas to establish underground movements before the Japanese entry.

His underground activities against Japanese occupation made him together with Pamudji, and hundreds of others were sentenced to death in 1944. He alone was saved by the bell thanks to Soekarno-Hatta for their interference asking for amnesty.

Amir Sjarifuddin kept following the Dimitrov Doctrine until 1948 when he ratified the Renville Agreement. This agreement raised the eyebrows of Moscow leaders as it was against  Zhdanov Doctrine they had adopted since September 1947, a strategy that ended the cooperation with the nationalists and colonialists elsewhere

Having lacked information, Muso defended Amir’s action, which he considered as merely a tactical movement. He further guaranteed that the leftist influences in the Republican military became stronger.  Alas, within days, Muso’s arguments were crumbled. Amir resigned from the Prime Ministry position and, Masyumi and Indonesian Nationalist Party, the Communist rivals, were getting stronger. This event caused Moscow’s harsh criticism toward Muso.

Russian analysts accused Muso as daydreaming justifying a strategy that led to calamity. Muso took his time to contemplate the criticism before making the responsibility to the central role to rectify the party struggle and ready to come back to his country for taking over the Communist leadership.

Following the dissolution of Amir cabinet, Sjahrir quitted the Socialist Party and established the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). Having his agenda, Amir merged Socialist Party into People’s Democratic Front (FDR), which he set in Solo on February 26, 1948. On top of his Socialist Party, others joined FDR, such as [illegal] PKI, Labor Party, Pesindo. As the FDR chairman, Amir took the side with Soviet instead of American capitalism and openly declared his desire to topple down Hatta, through rebellion if necessary.

In early April 1948, being depressed from Moscow criticism, Muso went to Praha to meet Soeripno, Indonesian representative posted there since 1947. Muso disguised himself as the secretary of Soeripno. Under the influence of Muso, Suripno opened a diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. This action made Hatta furious and called him back in less than a week to Jogjakarta.

Muso followed suit, taking a long journey from Praha-Cairo-New Delhi-Bangkok-Bukittinggi, kept hiding his own identity. Any time he was photographed, he hid his face behind a book or newspaper. As they landed at last at the swampy area near Tulungagung, Soemadi could see the optimism and courage radiated from  Muso, then disguised as Soeparto, who was ready at all cost to make his dream come true,  the establishment of Indonesian Soviet government.

The Tragic Life of Surabaya Hero

In the first week of December 1945, Surabaya fell to the hands of the British army after it had been defended fiercely by its people. The frontline shifted outward the city when Governor Soerjo installed his government to Sepanjang at Surabaya outskirt, and then to Mojokerto around 50 km southeast of Surabaya. Following the Dutch all-out assault, after the British army withdrew from the area, Soerjo’s government moved deeply further into the hinterland successively to Kediri and Malang.

On July 21, 1947, the Dutch launched the so-called first Police Action with all of their forces, which made Soerjo have to move to Blitar, where Dr. Moerdjani replaced him as East Java governor. Throughout all of the periods, he demonstrated his courage to lead his people to overcome all the hardships and difficulties confronting the Dutch offensive.

He got a new position as the deputy and soon after was installed as the chairman of the Supreme Consideration Council (DPA) in Jogjakarta, the then-Republican capital.  It was during his term as DPA chairman that the Communist Party led by a rather obscure figure named Muso, who just came back from Moscow, proclaimed the establishment of Soviet-Indo Republic on September 18, 1948.

Muso just became the top leader of the Communist Party. Many politicians, later on, joined him, including Amir Syarifuddin (the former Prime Minister), Setyadjit Soegondo, and members of Patuk Discussion Group, including D.N. Aidit, Syam Kamaruzzaman, Captain Soepardjo, Captain Abdul Latief, and Captain Oentoeng Samsoeri.

The day after, Soekarno aired his speech through national radio calling for the Indonesian people to choose: Muso or Soekarno-Hatta, followed by the armed clash between the Republic and Muso surrounded by his followers. At the height of the conflict, Soerjo got his unfortunate fate from the Communist rebels.

Before the rebellion, the Communists had dug many holes and prepared abandoned dry wells to put in the corpses. The Communist people killed not only ordinary people but also Magetan regent, attorneys, military, and Islamic leaders and put all 108 bodies in a dried well in Soco, Magetan Regency.

 

At Bangsri old well near Magetan, the Communist militants dumped ten corpses, all slaughtered with knives and machetes. At old dry Cigrok well, the Communist rebels dumped 22 bodies, many of whom were leaders of Islamic dormitory-schools in Takeran, East Java. Even according to the witness of the arrested Communist rebels, some Islamic leaders were still alive when they were dumped into well as they recited Al-Koran verses loudly. To mention a few, they were KH Iman Shofwan and his sons, Hadi Addaba and Imam Faham.

The Communists also slaughtered and buried 17 military officers, regional House of Representative members, journalists, and ordinary people at Dungus Village, near Magetan. It was around this time that they also murdered the younger brother of Soerjo, RM Sarjuno.

The Republicans knew these wells full of corpses 100 days later, following the acknowledgment of a Communist member who took part in the mass murders. However, the process of digging and re-examination of bodies could only be done in the 1950s after the internal condition was relatively conducive.

On November 10, 1948, after attending the ceremony of National Heroes’ Day in Jogjakarta, Soerjo went to Madiun to commemorate the 40^th day of his younger brother’s death. On the way, he stopped in Solo and spent the night there. Early in the morning, he went to Madiun, but while in Bago Village, Ngawi, he was intercepted by Communist rebels headed by Amir Sjarifuddin and Maladi Yusuf and put in custody. Almost at the same time, Police High Commissioner M Dierhat and Police Commissioner Soeroko, who came from different directions, were also arrested and put in custody.

The Communists brought three arrested high officers to Sonde Forest by the next day. There the communist bands killed them by hitting their heads with pieces of logs breaking their skulls apart. The corpses were found four days later, brought back to Magetan, and buried there at the Heroes’ Cemetery.

By the end of November, all Communist leaders and Muso’s supporting troops were killed in action or arrested. Eleven Communist leaders, including the then Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin, were executed on December 20, 1948, under the order of Colonel Gatot Soebroto and were buried at Ngalihan. Muso was shot dead days earlier. The order was carried out in a hurry because the day before, the Dutch had launched Police Action II and lasted until January 5, 1949.

Why on earth did Amir Sjarifuddin order or at least let the killing of ex-governor Soerjo, whom he knew personally during the battle of Surabaya? The question remains unanswered. In 1964, the Central Government, however, respected Soerjo’s merits and awarded him the title of National Hero, only one year before another Communist Coup broke out again.

A Ghost Train Heading to Jogjakarta

On the quiet evening of January 4, 1946, a series of railway carriages silently halted behind Soekarno’s East Pegangsaan residence, situated beside a railway track. Without causing any disturbance, Soekarno, Hatta, their families, and staff slipped into an unlit carriage unconnected to the others. A loyal train operator waited in the locomotive cabin, keeping a safe distance from the carriages.

This sight was not unusual, as a solitary carriage waiting to join others was a common occurrence. Upon a signal, the locomotive approached and coupled the carriage with the rest. Under the cover of a moonless night, Soekarno and his companions clandestinely embarked on a journey eastward to Jogjakarta, the forthcoming capital of the Republic.

The decision to depart was made the previous night due to the deteriorating situation in Jakarta. “The situation in Jakarta has become untenable. Tomorrow night, we will relocate the capital to Jogjakarta. No one should bring their belongings,” Soekarno warned. “There’s no time to pack everything, furniture or otherwise. You will stay close to me at all times for your safety.”

Following the landing of Allied soldiers in Jakarta and various parts of Java in September 1945, tensions escalated. By September 15, British First Admiral Patterson arrived at Tanjung Priok harbor aboard the HMS Cumberland, accompanied by Charles Van der Plas, the representative of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) at the Allied headquarters in Singapore.

After a minor incident with young Republicans, Van der Plas suggested to his British counterparts that eliminating the Japanese-created Republic would be swift and straightforward. Lowering the “red and white” flag from government buildings, capturing Soekarno and other leaders as Japanese collaborators and war criminals, would erase the Republic from history.

The situation for the Republic worsened when Hubertus J. van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, returned to Jakarta on October 5 from Brisbane, Australia, the headquarters of the Netherlands Indies government-in-exile. NICA soldiers, bolstered by ex-Japanese detainee Dutch soldiers, intensified their reign of terror in Jakarta, shooting anyone deemed suspicious.

In response, Soekarno imposed a curfew, but Dutch patrols continued to wreak havoc, looting homes, and terrorizing families. Clashes between the Dutch army and Jakarta residents escalated, with NICA soldiers committing atrocities such as abducting youths and shooting civilians without cause.

There were numerous attempts to capture or assassinate Soekarno. Once, during a late-night meeting with his ministers, Soekarno’s driver went to buy food only to have their vehicle collided with a military truck. The soldiers, believing Soekarno was inside, narrowly missed a fatal crash.

Due to the constant threat, Soekarno and his entourage had to constantly change their sleeping locations, avoiding open spaces or roads. Remaining in Jakarta was no longer an option; it endangered not only his life but the survival of the nation.

To counter foreign accusations of collaboration with the Japanese, Soekarno appointed Sjahrir as prime minister on November 14, 1945. However, this move drew criticism domestically for being unconstitutional.

With Indonesian armed forces withdrawn from the capital and no reliable police units deployed, the NICA army in Jakarta operated unchecked. On January 3, 1946, Soekarno decided to relocate the capital to Jogjakarta to escape the Dutch threat.

The “ghost train” carrying its notable passengers finally arrived at Jogjakarta, the new capital of the Republic of Indonesia. Although the exhausting journey ended, it marked the beginning of a new chapter. Indonesians now faced critical decisions: diplomacy or military action, survival, or demise, freedom, or death.