Could Beijing Prove Their Historical Exclusive Exercise Control Over SCS?


The long-awaited international tribunal verdict declaring that the Chinese Nine-Dash Line had no legal basis came with no surprise. July 12, 2016, judgment was just a simple ‘translation’ of the text written in UNCLOS 1982. What was new was its declaration on the fact that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over SCS.

It was no surprise either that China rejected the whole verdict and declared it as null and void. They claimed that the Nine-Dash Line was nothing to do with maritime delimitation but the territorial sovereignty issue. The court has, therefore, no authority to put a hand on the SCS dispute. They considered that the matter should be resolved among the different nations and thus will handle it and do business as usual.

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Already the United States, Japan, and Australia openly demanded China to observe the Tribunal Verdict. The European Union (EU) plan to do the same soon, but none from ASEAN countries that had a direct interest in the SCS will follow suit.  Sadly, not even a single word of sympathy uttered towards their college Philippine who won the case. Furiously China warned any country that criticized challenging Chinese attitude for not turning the SCS into a war arena.

Just a few days after the verdict, China announced they were planning to close off a part of the South China Sea for military exercises for a couple of days. China can do what they want to. But instead of showing forces, at least China should clarify to the international community who waited for China to challenge the Tribunal Verdict. China must show that they have substantial evidence on historical exercise exclusive control over SCS indeed. The international community wanted to know the detailed proofs on when, where, and which China armada that had ruled the SCS waves.

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The history, however, recorded only three famous Chinese maritime military expeditions. The first and second expeditions were to the North towards Japan, which both failed because of naval disaster as the whole armadas were wiped out by ‘kamikaze’ typhoon (1274 and 1281 AD). The third expedition was to the South purposely to invade Java in 1292 AD. The journey failed as the Javanese exercised their tactical trick of burning nearly the whole armadas behind the Chinese Army, who had landed and trapped in the middle of the unfamiliar rain forest. The site then became the capital of Majapahit, one of the biggest Indonesia ancient empires.

As far as Natuna EEZ’s concern, the Tribunal Verdict doesn’t have much effect on Indonesia’s determination to exercise its control over Natuna EEZ. It strengthens Indonesia’s EEZ status, but with or without the verdict, Indonesia’s position already firmed that there never exists a maritime overlapping with China in Natuna EEZ. And if they think otherwise, it is not Indonesian concerned at all.

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For Indonesia having a good relationship with China is strategically important both economically and politically. However, none of Indonesia people ever think that even a bit of Indonesian territorial, as well as its EEZ, is for sale. Indonesia is a peaceful country and doesn’t have any appetite to expand its territory and consider its neighboring countries to have the same attitude. Notwithstanding, Indonesia should now be more prudent towards specific campaigns such as the mystification of a legendary foreign maritime figure, the proposal to jointly building the 21st-century maritime silk road, the increasing number of illegal foreign work-forces in various significant projects. The government should seriously handle the revival movement of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), whatever weak it is, such as the circulation of their banners, etc.