Seize China Fishing Boat in Natuna EEZ, No Compromise About It

Indonesia has long settled the boundary around Natuna EEZ by UNCLOS with its neighboring countries. The border is now there firmly set up and recognized internationally except China. Indonesia regards China’s unilateral claim on the part of Natuna EEZ as their fishing ground is baseless. For Indonesia, holding negotiations with any country that tries to challenge its EEZ  is useless.

China has a dual system in running their country. In dealing with government affairs, it’s Communist Party who takes charge while in business; the party allows the government to adopt liberalism. The Communist Party knows that its Nine Dash-lines product will confront the ASEAN countries’ interest in the South China Sea (SCS). At the same time, they are willing to keep the business relationship with ASEAN countries intact.

China doesn’t seem confident in what they do in Natuna water. They are always escorting their fishing boats with their coastguards, the funniest thing that a country has ever done. It precisely what happened related to incidents taking in Natuna EEZ. The last incident occurred on June 18, 2016, when the Navy’s KRI Imam Bonjol 383 chased twelve Chinese fishing vessels a firing towards one of them (Yueyandong Yu 19038) after giving several warnings in concordance with the standard procedure. The warship commander stood firm and ignored the Chinese coastguards that tried to interfere with the vessel seizing.

The maneuver of so many China fishing boats could be suspected to test the water rather than solely catching the fish. Having faced such a situation, Indonesia must show its stern position to the world that Indonesia would never back off no matter the provocation comes. For Indonesia, the integrity of its EEZ is a matter of principle and will defend it at all cost.

Indonesia should be very cautious towards the sincerity of China’s statement on its recognition on the Natuna Islands as an integral part of Indonesia’s territory. It is now clear that China recognizes only the islands but not their surrounding water. The issue becomes more dangerous as China had issued a position paper in December 2014 that the dispute in SCS was a matter of sovereignty, not exploitation rights. Does China have a hidden agenda that sometime in the future they will claim the Dash-lines crossing Natuna EEZ as the delimitation of their sovereignty?

Being aware of China’s aggressiveness in imposing its claim, Indonesia could no longer maintain its neutral position. Indonesia should not behave like an ostrich and being selfish, ignoring their fellows ASEAN desperately confronting head-to-head with China in SCS. ASEAN should stand united against China, and as the most prominent nation among the community, Indonesia should stand in front.

One example of the embarrassing diplomatic move was what happened in ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Kunming, China, on June 14, 2016. It was sad to see that ASEAN broke apart, letting China take the leading role pressuring ASEAN countries to adopt Beijing’s stance in SCS. China has been keeping eyes on the gas-rich area in SCS and possibly in Natuna water as well. They could extend their claim on the right to exploit marine resources in the Natuna sea to the right to use the continental shelf beneath. This suspicion is logical if we look to what they did to build an oil platform in Vietnam offshore in 2014, which they claimed as theirs.

China claimed that the Nine Dash-Lines was a marine empire boundary established in the era of the Ming Dynasty around the 12^th century. Historically, we are doubtful that China ever ruled the waves imposing their power even on SCS. China was never becoming a naval country, and also, if they were so, it should occur in a brief period. Indonesia, on the other hand, was a maritime nation for a long time. In the era of Sriwijaya in the 8^th century and Majapahit in the 14^th century, the Royal Navy conquered what is now known as the Indonesian archipelago, Malaysia included.  Gajah Mada, one of the great Majapahit warlords,  sent big expeditions far west to Madagascar  (the island bears his name). Some in smaller groups had sailed up north as far as Taiwan and Japan. The people in Sulawesi and the eastern part of Indonesia had traditionally sailed off to the east across the Pacific Ocean, reaching as far as New Zealand in the south, Hawaii and Eastern Islands in the remote east. The vast area was known as the world of Tagaroa, the name of their common marine god.

The wooden boat generation, known as Phinisi, which was used by Indonesian ancestors, still survives until today, going around across the archipelago. Several expeditions have taken place using the replica of the ancient wooden boats heading to Madagascar and just recently to Japan, proving that such journeys were not only historical tales. Indonesia has more justification than what China did in claiming its maritime empire. Indonesia could include a much wider area by drawing Nine Thousand Dash-Lines covering those historical marine areas, including SCS. However, Indonesia was not that crazy to seriously pose such a notorious claim.

The End of Unwanted War

Following the abortive coup d’état of Communist on September 30, 1965, Soekarno’s position was deteriorating and coming to nadir when he unintentionally yielded the power to General Soeharto on March 11, 1966. Soeharto, who had to cope with the Communist Party, should also by then face the inherited confrontation against Malaysia, which weighed him down a great deal.

From the beginning, the Army officers were halfheartedly fighting against Malaysia. Soeharto did see that the Indonesian armed forces were not on par with Malaysia, British, Australia, and New Zealand forces combined under the Malaysia Independent Treaty. Soeharto once said: “I thought Soekarno just messed around with the confrontation, but he was indeed earnest.”

The worsening economic condition reflected by the price skyrocketing of essential commodities combined with the heating political conflicts made him determine to cease the confrontation. With authority on his hands, he established a secret mission to explore the possibility to phase out the fight.

Major Benny Moerdani led the mission carrying out his undercover activities by acting as an air ticketing salesman in Bangkok. From there, he tried to contact Malaysian sympathizers secretly. With the assistance of Tan Sri Ghazali, a prominent Malaysian politician and Des Alwi, a noted Indonesian dissident, Moerdani managed to arrange a meeting in Bangkok with the Malaysian Minister of Defense, Tun Abdul Razak, who was then very enthusiastic with the plan of a peace agreement.

Subsequently, Moerdani made a secret journey to Malaysia, where he met again with Tun Razak. Silently he visited Indonesian war prisoners and arranged a special trip for General Ali Moertopo, the head of Special Operation (Opsus), to Kuala Lumpur to hold the peace meeting.

Hardly any politicians and military personnel in both countries were aware of the plan for a peaceful settlement. Having uninformed about the policy, Tun Ismail, the Minister of Home Affairs, was very upset, but Tun Razak was able to calm him down. On the D-day, Prime Minister Tungku Abdurrahman didn’t believe what Razak told him that an Indonesian secret mission would about to come to meet him.

When the British representative knew that an Indonesian Hercules landed in Kuala Lumpur, they were furious. Even RAF threatened to shoot down the plane if it continued its flight to Kedah, which might fly across Butterworth, the British military base in Penang. To settle the problem down, several Malaysian high officials boarded on Hercules for the flight to Kedah, which made RAF officials speechless.

The meeting between Ali Moertopo’s team and Tungku Abdurrahman continued with a meeting between Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and Tun Razak in Bangkok on May 28, 1966. The final step took place in Jakarta, where both countries held the signing of the peace agreement, known as Jakarta Accord, on August 11, 1966.

From now on, Soeharto could concentrate his efforts to cope with political and economic difficulties and, more importantly, settle the residual Communist affairs.